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CASE COMMENTS

Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on the grounds that the right to
assistance of counsel should not attach until the formal institution
of proceedings by indictment, information or arraignment. He
reasoned that the majority's holding could have an unfortunate
impact on the fair administration of criminal justice. It may be
argued that if the requirement to provide counsel is extended to
the moment of detention, extra-judicial confessions might categorically be held inadmissible. Note, 63 Miclr. L. RBv. 381 (1964).
The West Virginia court has awarded habeas corpus relief on
the basis of two federal constitutional grounds-the right to counsel
and the right to a free transcript. This provided a significant
broadening of the rather limited reach of the traditional state habeas
corpus remedy. There appears to be nothing to prevent the court
from awarding state habeas corpus relief on the basis of a violation
of constitutional rights laid out in the Jackson, Stevenson and
Escobedo cases. If May and Banach actually represent a crack
in the door, as they appear to, state habeas corpus relief conceivably
could be opened to all constitutional objections which may now
be advanced in federal courts.
Lester Clay Hess, Jr.

Criminal Law-Confessions Before Arraignment
Petitioner, a state prisoner, sought habeas corpus relief in the
federal court. Petitioner claimed that his state court conviction
violated his constitutional rights because it was based on an
inadmissible confession. The confession was obtained after he had
been arrested without a warrant and questioned about a fire which
had resulted in a death. No formal charges were lodged against
petitioner until after the confession had been signed. The writ of
habeas corpus was denied and petitioner appealed. Held, affirmed.
The use of a confession freely given does not deny due process,
even though the confession was obtained during a period of unlawful detention. The test is whether the confession was voluntary
or coerced. Allen v. Bannan, 332 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1964).
State concern with admissibility of evidence obtained between
arrest and arraignment has become more intense since the establishment of the McNabb-Mallory rule in the federal courts. This
rule excludes from federal prosecutions all incriminating statements
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obtained during unlawful pre-commitment detention, regardless of
whether it was voluntarily made. Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
The theory behind such rulings is that the accused should not be
incriminated by his own evidence which was gained as a result
of "third degree" tactics during police interrogation. The fact that
the police officer has the mere opportunity to employ abusive
questioning will bar evidence obtained during such time. Cleary v.
Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963).
The McNabb-Mallory doctrine is an evidentiary rule adopted by
the United States Supreme Court, and state courts do not apply the
rule as a matter of state law. Ingram v. State, 252 Ala. 497, 42 So.2d
36 (1949); State v. Browning, 206 Ark. 791, 178 S.W.2d 77 (1944).
While some states have considered the Mallory rule on the merits
and refused to adopt it, others simply feel that the "fruits" of such
detention is a valid police method of gaining evidence. State v.
Traub, 150 Conn. 169, 187 A.2d 230 (1962). Present constitutional
limits recognized and applied in determining whether a confession
is admissible in state proceedings is "voluntariness." This involves
the question of whether the confession was freely given. A confession is inadmissible under the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution unless the state can prove that the confession was
voluntary. The question of voluntariness, in most jurisdictions, is
determined by the trial judge through a preliminary hearing of the
evidence in absence of the jury. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 217
Pa. 77, 66 At. 233 (1907); State v. Brady, 104 W. Va. 523, 140
S.E. 546 (1927). Such evidence is usually conflicting and vague
because of the necessity of considering actual physical abuse as
well as subtle psychological pressure. The psychological factors
which must be taken into consideration produce confusion and
promote inconsistency. Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
This situation, at best, leaves the judge with a difficult decision;
where is the line to be drawn between improper and permissible
police conduct so as to provide due process? The judge must weigh
the voluntary consent against the police action so as to protect
individual rights. Strong indications of guilt only increase the
difficulty of this decision since the judge may unconsciously be influenced by his sociological ideas concerning adequate police protection for society. The principal case is a product of such state
judicial determinations.
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Since the states and the United States Supreme Court disagree
as to whether denying admissibility of evidence is necessary to discourage "third degree" tactics, it becomes interesting to consider
the proposition of the Court someday ruling that voluntary confessions obtained during unlawful detention cannot be used as
evidence in state courts. Such a holding could be justified under
the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the
federal constitution. Recent court decisions quickly disclose that
the "voluntariness" rule now applied by the states is inadequate,
because it does not provide due process as interpreted by the Court
in other areas. The Court, in dealing with illegal search and seizure,
states that the illegality of the search bars the evidence so obtained. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This is simply a part
of a broader rule which declares that the illegal search cannot be
legalized by what it brings to light. Nuesleiu v. District of
Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940). It seems that the
authority cited in the principal case may have been undercut by
the Mapp decision. The court, in the principal case, did not
squarely face the issue of whether the confession was illegally
obtained evidence. Compare this with evidence gained by illegal
detention. A man cannot be arrested without a warrant unless
there is reasonable grounds for making such an arrest; therefore,
when a person is arrested on "probable cause," it is all the more
important that he be taken directly to a magistrate in order to
substantiate the validity of the "probable cause." Mallory v. United
States, supra. In United States v. Arrington, 215 F.2d 630 (7th Cir.
1954), a confession obtained unlawfully was not admitted to prove
the existence of tangible evidence, and the court indicated that
the statement as well as the tangible evidence must be admitted
together or not at all. Since the United States Supreme Court is
not willing to accept unlawfully obtained tangible evidence, it
seems logically to follow that they will not allow intangible evidence so gained. This conclusion becomes overwhelming when
Escobedo v. Illinois, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964) is added to the
analogy.
By tracing the recent judicial rulings on the issue of right to
counsel, the trend toward complete protection becomes apparent.
First, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the Court held
that it was a violation of assistance of counsel, as stated in the sixth
amendment and made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth
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amendment, for an accused to be denied representation in the trial
court. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), extended this
doctrine to provide adequate counsel for an indicted defendant
under police interrogation. The Court reasoned that a judicial
system which provides for legal representation at trial would surely
protect a defendant in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. The
final ruling in this area came in Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, where
the defendant's request for counsel at the police interrogation stage
was denied; this illegality was added to by the fact that the defendant was not advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.
After prolonged questioning the defendant confessed to part of
the alleged crime, and the confession thus obtained was a major
factor in the subsequent conviction. In reversing the decision, the
Court ruled that an accused is entitled to counsel when the investigation ceases to be general in nature and begins to focus on the
particular suspect. Police officials have argued that such a restriction will result in fewer convictions, and seriously affect their
ability to deter criminal acts. The fallacy of such reasoning becomes
apparent when considered in light of the provisions of the federal
constitution. Granted that a policeman's job is not a happy one,
the plight of his prisoner must also be considered. It may well be
that a system of enforcement which cannot rely so heavily on the
"confession" will produce more reliable evidence through independent investigation.
Some states have begun to recognize the sound reasoning of the
McNabb-Mallory rule which forbids as evidence a confession obtained during unlawful detention. Some of the recent decisions
at least indicate that the state courts are beginning to recognize
the trend of federal rulings. In People v. Trinchillo, 2 App. Div.2d
146, 153 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1956), the court ordered a new trial to
determine whether a confession obtained after prolonged detention
should be admitted as evidence. An early Virginia decision also
recognized the serious violation of individual rights that can occur
during illegal' police interrogation. Enoch v. Commonwealth,
141 Va. 411, 126 S.E. 222 (1925). But some states have even
refused to recognize the constitutional question involved. State v.
Fahy, 149 Conn. 577, 183 A.2d 256 (1962). In other decisions the
trial judge did not consider the issue himself and neglected to
instruct the jury that such a confession could be considered voluntary or involuntary and so weighed in their determination of guilt
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or innocence. Stevenson v. Boles, supra; State v. Goyet, 119 Vt.
167, 132 A.2d 623 (1957).
The conclusion that such confession should not be admitted as
evidence seems hard to escape when considered in light of the fact
that such an accused has been denied advice of counsel and the
right to be properly charged. When both of these abuses combine
to produce incriminating statements, voluntary or involuntary, the
subsequent use of such evidence should be prohibited. Such a conclusion was recognized even before Escobedo v. Illinois, supra,
when the Chief Justice and three other members of the Court
dissented to a conviction based on a voluntary confession elicited
from a "suspect" who had been denied the assistance of counsel.
Crooker v. California,357 U.S. 433 (1958).
The fact that the United States Supreme Court has had to deal
with this issue so frequently makes a new ruling in this area almost
inevitable. It seems that the federal courts have been trying to
allow the states to solve this problem for themselves without making
a sweeping policy ruling. The ideal way for the states to do this
would be to find more unlawfully obtained confessions involuntary
because of the psycological pressures which are surely being exerted
on a suspect when he is held for days without counsel, arraignment,
or proper treatment. The tendency now is in a direction which
may even go farther than the comparable Escobedo v. Illinois,
supra; the ultimate effect of this may well produce the elimination
of any interrogation whatsoever before counsel is provided and
proper arraignment given.
Dennis Raymond Lewis

Divorce-Merger of Separation Agreement into
Divorce Decree
D grossly misrepresented the value of his assets to induce P
to accept a relatively small lump sum payment as a property
settlement and for her waiver of future support payments. P subsequently obtained a divorce and the separation agreement was
incorporated into the decree. There was no judicial inquiry as to
the fairness or adequacy of the agreement. P later learned of the
husband's fraud, brought an action of deceit and recovered judg-
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